



Boko Haram Insurgency: Its Genesis, Recruitment Methods and Impact in Borno State

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Abstract. This article examines the genesis of the Boko Haram insurgency especially its doctrinal foundations and the fertile ground that made the group to thrive at the time that it emerged. Which included social exclusion, economic deprivation and environmental degradation. While the recruitment methods employed by the group included indoctrination, forceful conscription and inducement. However, the main outlook of the article is the impact of Borno Haram which demography, economic, religious and political aspects. These included loss of lives, destruction of infrastructures displacement of about 2 million people. The methodology employed is qualitative research in which content analysis and oral interviews are used. In conclusion, the Boko Haram group which started as a local proselytizing group metamorphosed into a monster that wreaked havoc on all aspects of the Borno society. It is recommended that to forestall the emergence of similar groups like the Boko Haram, the Nigerian State create job opportunities, engage the youth use learned scholars in countering violent ideologies.

Keywords: Boko Haram insurgency, Genesis, Recruitment methods, Impact, Ideology

1. Introduction

The Boko Haram (literally Western education is prohibited) group has been causing harm and havoc in the North East for the last 13 years. At a time, between 2014 and 2015, the group was in control of large swaths of land across Borno and Adamawa where they declared their caliphate. The group's reign of terror has claimed more than 2700 lives, displaced some 2 million people, and cost the Nigerian an estimated \$17 billion (dollars) in infrastructural damage and output losses; in addition to the apocalyptic devastation and traumatized communities it left behind. (Mustapha and Meagher: 2018).

The group under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, a fiery and charismatic preacher, gained prominence in 2009 when they clashed with security forces in which Yusuf was subsequently killed by the police. The group was to emerge in 2010 under the leadership of the megalomaniac Abubakar Shekau more brutal and deadlier. The group engaged in targeted assassinations, suicide bombings and exploding Improvised Devices (IEDs). By 2014, the group has over run most of Northern Borno, Bama, Gwoza, some local government areas in Adamawa and established their authority. This article will, therefore, discuss the genesis of the Boko Haram insurgency, the recruitment methods of the group and the impact it had on Borno in all aspects of life.

2. Background to the Emergence of Boko Haram

A lot has been written on the reasons for the emergence of Boko Haram or the *Jama'atu Ahlil-Sunnah Lid-Dawa'ati wal Jihad*. They proffered that the emergence of Boko Haram should be understood within the context of the society that it emerged. Alexander Thurston, for example, attributed the rise of Boko Haram to early post-colonial Northern Nigeria where various trends- political, economic, and social- were intertwining with shifts in Muslim identity and politics. Therefore, the emergence of Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau as revolutionaries might have been fueled by political failures, religious fragmentation, and dashed expectations in North-eastern Nigeria. (Thurston, 2018. p, 37).

In order to understand the cause for the rise of Boko Haram, is the introduction of secular education that relegated traditional *Tsangaya* system in Borno. Since its introduction, it has been viewed with suspicion not only in Borno but in the wider Northern Region. The local population believed that the secular education was to glorify western values

including Christianity and to undermine traditional values. (Mustapha and Meagher: 2020, P.76). Thus, even presently in areas like Northern Borno, children hardly go to school and even those that are enrolled, there is high withdrawal cases. This provided fodder for the thriving of the Boko Haram ideology.

Another factor which might have helped in the rise of Boko Haram is the environmental factor. The drying of the Lake Chad to a smaller lake is accompanied with several repercussions. The areas for farmlands decreased as well as fishing areas which was marked by shrinking size of fish caught. With neither fishing grounds or farmlands, thousands of villagers have been driven towards Maiduguri in search of livelihoods contributing to rising social and economic pressures (Mustapha and Meagher: 2020, p.80).

Therefore, in spite of Boko Haram's ideological basis for its existence, there are underlying factors to consider like social, economic and political factors which made it to thrive at the time it did. Thus, it can safely be said, that Boko Haram is not a product of local and religious values but of the dysfunctional effects of extreme environmental and economic stresses amid political indifference and social neglect (Mustapha and Meagher: 2020, p.90). The genesis of Boko Haram can be traced to the intrusion of radical Salafi ideas which was preached by a very charismatic scholar with oratorical skills and found fertile ground for fruition in social exclusion, economic deprivation and environmental degradation that afflicted the Borno area.

3. The rise of Mohammed Yusuf and his ideology

The 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of reform Salafi movements like the *Izalatul-Bid'a wa Iqamatus-Sunnah*- Society for the eradication of innovation and establishment of Sunnah. But by the 1990s and 2000s, the coming of graduates from universities in Saudi Arabia with more militant ideas made them to go on their own detached from the main *Izala* movement. Though identifying with the general principles of *Izala*, they were not in the main stream of the *Izala* organization. The rise of Mohammed Yusuf, who was to lead the Boko Haram, should be understood within this context.

The level of Mohammed Yusuf's Islamic knowledge has not been verified, but the little that is known show that he has studied under some scholars. By the 1990s he was popular among the youth in Maiduguri, and used to visit schools, for preaching under the auspices of the Muslim Students' Society (MSS).

That period also marked the coming of the Medina University trained scholar, Jafar Mahmud Adam to Maiduguri. Henceforth, Jafar became Yusuf's mentor and sometimes preach in place of the Sheikh in the Indimi Mosque. The relationship between the two was to get sour because while Jafar was pragmatic and practical, Yusuf was militant and confrontational.

After alterations in the Indimi Mosque, where Yusuf sometimes deputizes for Sheikh Jafar, he was expelled from the mosque. He later built his Mosque in the neighborhood known as Railway Quarters in Maiduguri and named it after Ibn Taymiyya. Ibn Taymiyya's movement had propagated a reform to form of Islam as existed during the prophet's and these ideas would later have a major influence on Wahabbism and Salafism. (Smith: 2015).

The movement that was led by Mohammed Yusuf was called various names like Yusufiyya, Boko Haram, but they called themselves *Jama'atu Ahlil-Sunnah Lid-Dawa'ati wal Jihad*. The movement started as mainly a quietist Salafi Group, to a militant Salafi movement (from 2009-2010), to a group capable of striking across Northern and central Nigeria (from 2011 to 2013), to an established state (2014), to an affiliated and branch the Islamic State (ISIL or ISIS) as its West African Province – Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP). (Kassim and Nwankpa: 2018, p1).

According to some sources, Mohammed Yusuf became the disciple of Abu Abdur Rahman Mohammed Ali al-Barnawi (the leader of the Nigerian Taliban) in approximately 2002 after Ali's Shaikh and mentor Abu al Bara al-Daurawi fled out of the country out of fear of being arrested to Saudi Arabia with the initial seed money received from members of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (Kassim and Nwankpa; 2018, p.10).

From his centre at the Railway Quarters, Yusuf held lectures, Quranic interpretations or exegesis (Tafsir), Ta'alims and going around the wards in the town for preaching. Soon Yusuf's tentacles spread to other towns like Bauchi, Kano, Gombe, and others. His cassettes also began to go beyond Nigeria's borders to countries like Niger, Chad and Cameroon. As a result of this, he gained followership not only within the country, but beyond to neighboring countries. The teachings of Mohammed Yusuf were mainly derived from Saudi Arabian and Syrian books, mostly circulated during the latter 1990s and 2000s and often cites quietist Salafi scholars like Nasiruddeen Albani and Salafi Jihadi, al-Zarqawi (Hassan and Nwankpa: 2018, p.2). In his major

writing – *Hadhihi Aqidatuna wa Minhaj Dawatina* (this is our creed and method of proclamation) he expounded his main doctrinal beliefs. Some of the most important sections in the book concern democracy which he called ‘idol of this age’, education, national symbols of the police and army, the full implementation of the Sharia, etc.

Some of the expositions of Yusuf in the book included his saying that “those who follow their legal system, and resort to illegitimate rulers (*Tawaghit*) for judgments are polytheists... when they commit unbelief, then rebelling against them is obligatory to the one who is capable... when they order a rebellious action against Allah then there is no further hearing or obedience. This is our proclamation, and we announce it to the Umma. We call the people to reform the creed, application of the law and to Jihad (Kassim and Nwankpa: 2018, p.29). In his exposition, he drew a lot from Qadi Iyad, Ibn Taymiyya and Al-Zarqawi.

Furthermore, in a BBC Hausa interview, Mohammed Yusuf said:

As for my creed, I believe in the creed of the Prophet Muhammad. I follow the Book of Allah and the Sunna of the Prophet. On the issue of my creed, I developed my understanding from the book Aqida al-Tahawiyah (the creed of Imam Tahawi) by Abu Jafar Al-Tahawi. I share the same creed with him.....I have read Kitab-al-Tawhid- Book of Tawhid and al-Usul-as-Thalathah (The Three Foundations of Truth). I share the religious rulings of scholars like Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. This is my creed and Allah knows best (Kassim and Nwankpa: 2018, p.73).

Mohammed Yusuf from his expositions and preaching admired hardline clerics and adopted Salafist thought as further buttressed by naming his center- *Markaz* after Ibn Taymiyya. He attracted people through oratory and charismatic appeal. His preaching was receptive and it was the one they one with especially his crusade against Western influence found fertile ground around Maiduguri and elsewhere because democracy was seen as elite filling their pockets while the masses of poor people struggle to survive. (Smith:2015).

Mohammed Yusuf’s preaching emboldened his followers to reject the state authority and its laws. It was only a matter of time before his incendiary preaching would attract reaction from the state. There were times when he was arrested but he usually came out on bail. It appeared that his followers were becoming a state within a state with them refusing to obey the secular laws. The incident that spiraled in to

a full-blown uprising was the refusal of the Boko Haram motorcyclists to wear helmets. This led to misunderstanding between the group and the “Operation Flush” who were enforcing the law in which members of the group were shot. After this incident, Mohammed Yusuf issued a very inflammatory ultimatum to state declaring that they will avenge the dead of their brothers. By July 2009, the movement attacked the Maiduguri Maximum Security Prison, Police College and many Police Stations within the metropolis and total war against the state. It took the intervention of the military before the Boko Haram members were subdued and flushed out of their *Markaz*. Mohammed Yusuf himself was captured by the military who handed him over to the police where he was subsequently killed.

The group was to go underground only to re-emerge deadlier under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau. They unleashed a reign of terror in Maiduguri by engaging in targeted killing of people, planting Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in worship centers, undertaking suicide missions, and burning of schools and telecommunication masts. They came to occupy some wards in Maiduguri which served as their launching pads. The military were deployed to quell the menace but proved abortive until the emergence of the Civilian Joint Task Force or *Kato da Gora* who flushed them out of the town. The group subsequently moved to Sambisa Forest from where they expanded and brought a number of Local Governments areas under their so-called caliphate. By 2015 they metamorphosed into the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) with their allegiance to the leader of the ISIS, Abubakar al-Baghdadi.

4. Recruitment Methods of the Group

The group is not a formal organization with a register for members to come and join, but was a movement open to all and sundry. Two periods of recruitment can be discerned in the group- before the 2009 uprising and post 2009 uprising. In terms of religious and ideological commitment, members who joined before the 2009 uprising were more attuned to Boko Haram messages. In this period, Mohammed Yusuf’s personality, charisma and oratory played a major role in rallying people to the group. Yusuf was described as a gifted demagogue and persuasive debater. Many people who knew him, including Christians often make reference to his charismatic style of preaching with which he attracted followers (Mustapha & Meagher: 2018, p.85). These members who firmly believed in Mohammed Yusuf’s teachings being Islamic, were mainly composed of *Tsangaya* students

who filled with his radical ideas rebelled against their teachers, parents and the communities to which they belonged by becoming students and die-hard supporters of Yusuf (Mustapha & Meagher: 2018, p.85).

Subsequently, Yusuf other forms of inducement to the members of the group was economic empowerment by giving them capital to establish petty businesses. Transportation, retailing and agriculture were Yusuf's main targets. Motorcycles and vehicles were given to members on hire-purchase and petty businesses like hawking dates, perfumes, and others were encouraged and supported by Yusuf. This was how the membership of the group swelled. Though it is difficult to have an actual number of the group, it is estimated that by 2009 it had about 5,000 passive and active members living close to the *Markaz* (Mustapha & Meagher: 2018, p.85).

Another method used in recruiting is the use of social ties where members bring in their friends, families and others. This is also coupled with the vulnerability of youth to engage in radical movements on the basis of a search for camaraderie, adventure or a quest for alternative futures. (Mustapha & Meagher: 2018, p.85). Furthermore, widowhood also became an inducement for women to become members. Support was given to women whose husbands were killed by the military and proposal for marriages.

Thus, the pre-2009 period recruitment method was mainly through appealing words, oratory, philanthropy and inducement with money, but after 2009, the group took a more vigorous approach. (Zanna Buguma: 2021). The recruitment process became forceful through abduction and kidnapping of people along the roads or the villages they invaded. In the villages that they invaded many youths were conscripted either forcefully or through inducement with money.

According to Ahmed Bello non-Boko Haram members were also used especially girls and women in the detonation of IEDs. He narrated the case of a girl hawking in Bauchi, Zahra'u, who was taken from Bauchi to Kano through enticement of making money. A suicide vest was put on the girl and a remote control was given to her. She was told that if she pressed the remote control, money will be coming out of the vest. However, she became frightened when the other girl they were with was torn into pieces after pressing her remote control. There was the case of a lady also who was abducted from Maiduguri, drugged and taken to Kano. When she woke up, she found that she was strapped with a

suicide vest, she cried for help and was rescued by the police.

5. The Impact of the Insurgency in Borno State

The Boko Haram group has devastated and wreaked havoc on not only Maiduguri, but also, surrounding local governments. Their havoc on infrastructure, human beings, and other facilities has been very ruthless so that the group has been declared by the Global Terrorism Index as the world's deadliest terror group. The insurgency had impact on all aspects and spheres of lives in Borno.

Impact on Education

As one of the cardinal principles of the organization was preaching against Western education, the group's impact on education has been very colossal both in terms of destruction of schools, the killings of teachers and the abduction of students especially girls. At the early stage, the groups' opposition to western education was mainly condemnation and preaching against the evils of western education. But when the group became a full blown insurgent group, they began to deliberately target and kill teachers, school administrators and education officials.

A Human Right watch report which documented Boko Haram brutal assaults on schools, students and teachers for the period between 2009 and 2015 for Borno, Yobe and Kano showed that more than 910 schools were destroyed and at least 1,500 more were forced to close. At least 611 teachers have been deliberately killed and another 19,000 forced to flee. The group was said to have abducted more than 4000 civilians, many of them were women and girls, including large group of pupils and students, both boys and girls (Ashafa and Kullima: 2018, p.48).

Furthermore, by 2017 record indicated that 512 basic education schools in Borno State suffered various degrees of destruction. These included head teacher offices and stores. In some junior secondary schools, laboratories, water points, toilets, perimeter walls, and instructional materials were vandalized. In one of the acts of bestiality, when the group attacked schools in Bama in 2014, they resorted to tearing of all books and other documents into pieces before burning them to ashes. (Ashafa and Kullima: 2018, p.50).

Between the period of 2013 and 2014, all public schools within Maiduguri and surrounding Local Government areas of Bama, Jere and Konduga were closed. As the intensity of the Boko Haram attacks became prevalent, the state government ordered the

closure of schools in all vulnerable local government areas within Borno central, Borno North, and parts of Borno South Senatorial Districts. (Ashafa and Kullima: 2018, p. 50). The closure of these schools has not only negatively impacted on education in Borno, but has affected and robbed a generation of children of future hopes and livelihood.

The crowning of the Boko Haram brutal attacks was perhaps their daring intrusion on Government Secondary School Chibok, on the night of April 14, 2014, where they abducted 276 girls from their dormitories and took them to the dreadful Sambisa Forest- their base. This attack gained international attention and sent a chill on the spines of all parents who have children in boarding schools in the North East. Parents became apprehensive in sending their children to boarding schools because of fear of abduction. There was another attack in Damasak on November 24, 2014 where about 300 primary pupils were held hostage. This was not helped by the appearance of the Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shakau, in several video clips saying that women and girls would continue to be abducted to turn them to the path of true Islam and to ensure that they did not attend school. (Ashafa and Kullima: 2018, p.51).

Since teachers were the symbols and disseminators of western education, they were especially targeted by the Boko Haram. A field research estimated that about 474 teachers in the Basic Education sector lost their lives or declared missing, in addition to about 17 of them been injured; 85 teachers at the senior secondary school level were said to have been killed and at the tertiary institutions, Borno College of Education, Science and Technology Bama lost 32 of its lecturers, the College of Business and Administrative Studies Konduga lost 6 lecturers, the Ramat Polytechnic, Maiduguri lost 3 lecturers, the Mohammed Lawan College of Agriculture lost a lecturer, while the University of Maiduguri lost 3 lecturers apart from those abducted. (Ashafa and Kullima: 2018, p.52).

Another negative impact of the insurgency on education is the conversion of schools into military bases and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps. As schools were perhaps the only solid structures in most communities in Borno, the military tend to occupy them where ever they went. Likewise, civilians who were displaced flocked to the available schools to camp there. The conversion of these schools to military bases has not only denied children of their right to education, but, it has also made the schools targets for attacks by the insurgents.

Thus, the insurgency affected education negatively in Borno not only in terms of destruction of facilities, but it made many parents to withdraw their children from schools. It also led to the prolonged closure of schools which distorted the academic calendar. In Borno, for example, schools have been grounded almost at all levels. Primary and secondary schools have been closed in 22 out of 27 local government areas for at least two years, and public secondary schools in Maiduguri, which was the 'safest' were only reopened in February 2016 after internally displaced people, who occupied most of the schools, were relocated elsewhere. (Ashafa and Kullima: 2018, p.53).

5.1 Political Impact

The Boko Haram's main aim was to establish an Islamic state in which they targeted the modern secular political structure and its representative. The traditional political institutions as well as politicians were hard hit by the group. As a result of the insurgency, almost all the traditional rulers in Borno, except the Emir of Biu, abandoned their emirates and took refuge in Maiduguri. Many symbols of traditional authorities like ward heads, village heads and district heads were killed. For example, the Shehu of Borno said that about 14 district heads were killed during the period of the insurgency.

The insurgents were able to ransack a member of emirates and chiefdoms between 2014 and 2015 in Borno where they established their caliphate. The chiefdoms/emirates in point are Bama, Dikwa, Gwoza, and Askira/Uba. In one instance, the Emir of Gwoza was killed on the road by the insurgents while travelling to Gombe. The exit of these rulers from their domains created vacuum which the insurgents came to fill. For instance, Dikwa was prominently taken over by one Gamergu minor, Yaga as head (Amir), so also Gwoza which at different times fell under different sect leaders. (Kullima, Garba and Babagana: 2017). The political class was affected by the insurgency in which became soft targets for assassination by the insurgents. A commissioner for Justice, Alhaji Zanna Malam Gana was killed in Bama which sent shock waves to political office holders. This incident made government officials to stop using official vehicles, reside in highly secured areas and restricting their movements. Some of the officials who lost their lives include ANPP gubernatorial flag bear for 2011 election, Modu Fannami Gubio, the chairman of Jere Local Government council, Mustapha Ba'ale, the Chairman of Damboa Local government council, Dr. Lawan Kawu and two former chairmen of Kukawa Local

Government council, Alhaji Bukar Abatcha and Ali Lawan Yarayi. In addition, Modu Bintube, member representing Konduga in Borno State House of Assembly, Kadiri Kazaa, former commissioner and several councilors too numerous to mention across the state could not escape the menace of the Boko Haram insurgents. (Kullima, Garba and Babagana, 2017).

The insurgency also affected party politics and electoral outcome especially during the 2011 elections. The sect members targeted Ali Modu Sheriff and all politicians who shared political ideals with him and party – the ANPP. Paradoxically, the electorates believe rightly or wrongly that the former Governor was in tandem with the insurgents. This led to the failure of the former to clinch the Borno Central Senatorial Seat. Other ANPP candidates in Maiduguri Metropolitan, Jere, and Bama also lost their seats to the PDP.

6. Impact on Religion

The Boko Haram group though claiming to be religious, persecuted and killed followers of all religious divides- either Islam or Christianity as long as one does not subscribe to their own ideology. Muslims and Christian worshipers were attacked in their places of worship- Mosques and Churches. In 2013, for example, Improvised Explosive Device was detonated in the central mosque in the premises of the Shehu of Borno's Palace where many worshipers including some courtiers of the Shehu of Borno were killed. The Shehu of Borno and the Late Deputy Governor, Zanna Umar Mustapha narrowly escaped. (Kullima, Garba and Babagana; 2017).

Several other places of worship like Mosques and Churches were similarly attacked. A most frightening attack was the one that took place at the Junior Staff Quarters Mosque, University of Maiduguri, where a suicide bomber attacked and claimed the lives of a professor and three other people. There were other pockets of IED explosions in many Mosques and Churches too numerous to mention. Similarly, many people especially security uniformed men were randomly killed in several mosques around Maiduguri. Coupled with this was the fact that the group killed a number of Islamic scholars who were opposed to their ideology especially those they regarded as soothsayers.

The Boko Haram insurgency also led to the loss of many lives of innocent Muslims especially during the military operations in 2009 and after. During this period, many people who had Islamic identity like beards, and wearing turban were summarily

executed. A lot of people at this time shaved their beards and changed their modes of dressing in order to escape from the watchful eyes of the security agents.

7. Demographic Impact

The insurgency has introduced new demographic pattern in Borno with the displacement of people from Northern and Central Borno to Niger, Cameroon, Maiduguri and other States in the country like Adamawa, Gombe, Bauchi, Jigawa and Kano. This population movement produced a new settlement paradigm which clearly shows that population in the rural areas massively declined while that of the urban areas geometrically increased (Kullima, Garba and Babagana: 2017).

Many of the displaced persons who moved to states like Gombe Bauchi and Jigawa got good reception and settled down fully in their newly found homes. In Bauchi alone, there are two thriving communities of displaced people from Borno. One is a Shuwa Arab community and the other a ward known as Madina in Bauchi Town. There are replicas of these communities around other states. These communities are not likely to go back to their former abode even after normalcy returned.

In Maiduguri, too, a lot of the displaced persons have settled down and absorbed themselves unto the community. These people are also not likely to go back to their former communities either because some of them have become too old to go back or found easy means of livelihood in Maiduguri especially modern amenities or fear of the unknown in their former abodes. Furthermore, some of them might have found other means of livelihood and might enrolled their wards in schools or other life activities. So, even if the insurgency was to end, at least a quarter of the population of Northern Borno are not likely to go back to their former communities leading to loss of population.

8. Economic Impact

The insurgency led to the collapse of almost all economic activities in Borno and the level of the devastation can never be quantified only guestimates can be made. Most people used phrases such as "catastrophic collapse", "complete destruction", 'total wipeout' and 'grave consequences' to describe what they consider to be the adverse consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on Borno and its people (p. 91) There was the paralysis of business, destruction of economic and basic infrastructures,

creation of scarcity of food and portable water. Businesses have been wiped out, and this has created massive unemployment in the land and people can no longer care for themselves. (Granville: 2020, p.91).

Furthermore, the state economy has nosedived, and Borno people live in abject poverty because the insurgency has destroyed farmlands, several markets have been looted and subsequently burnt or forced to close. (Granville: 2020, p.92).

In the same vein, there was divestment of business to other places. Local investors who normally are supposed to contribute to economic development were forced to relocate as no investor will invest in a violent prone environment (Famulusi and Oshomoh: 2019, p. 219). Many businessmen from Borno have invested in other businesses like the hotel industry sachet water production and filling stations in places like Kano and Bauchi.

The insurgency also marked the relocation of non-indigenes from Borno to other states and that has brought down the state's economy because the people were majorly in control of trading and commercial activities before the insurgency. Most of these people were owners and operators of small-scale manufacturing and trading businesses. Their businesses were destroyed by Boko Haram terrorists, and majority of them have fled to their states. (Granville: 2020, p.92).

Commercial activities were severely affected all across the state. Many markets were forcefully closed either by the state or by the insurgents. Renowned markets like Damasak were closed because of its capture by the insurgents. At a time, even the Gamboru cattle market in Maiduguri was closed because it was found out that many of the cattle dealers were selling cattle rustled by the Boko Haram. After the sale, the proceeds were returned to the insurgents which they used in sustaining the insurgency.

Agricultural activities both farming and livestock were grossly affected by the insurgency. Farmlands were no longer available because of the displacement of the people from their communities and even where land was available, there was the fear of the insurgents attacking the farmers in their farms. This was demonstrated in Zabarmari massacre when the insurgents killed about 70 farmers while in their farms. Sometimes the insurgents harvest the farms while at other times, they set the farms on fire. The livestock also suffered as the insurgents engaged in cattle rustling and in areas controlled by the insurgents the herders had to pay taxes. The

constriction of grazing lands around the Lake Chad because it came under the control of the Boko Haram, forced the herders to move to Southern Nigeria and the Middle Belt area which might aggravated the conflict between farmers and herders.

Other sectors impacted by the insurgency are the telecommunication and banking sectors. When the former president, Goodluck Jonathan declared State of Emergency on Borno, Yobe and some parts of Adamawa States, there was total blackout of communication. All the mobile networks were closed for a period of six months. The companies might have incurred huge losses in addition to others who depended on the communication for survival like phone repairers and recharge card retailers. The banking sectors also was hit by the insurgents, who attacked several banks within Maiduguri and looted money. Banks in other towns like Damboa, and Gwoza were also attacked and looted. The banks were forced to change their work schedule from the usual 8.00 AM -4.00 PM to 9.00 AM -12.00 Noon.

9. Social Impact

Although other social aspects like religion and demography have been mentioned earlier, here we are concerned with the cultural practices and social practices affected by the insurgency. During the peak of the insurgency, festivals for marriage and naming ceremony hardly took place. People feared to gather for these ceremonies and marriage ceremony hardly took more than five minutes and people will disperse hurriedly. Entertainment no longer took place as the insurgents targeted musicians and many of them were killed. The Shehu of Borno lamented that the Boko Haram killed people indiscriminately including his royal musicians. The royal musicians killed by the insurgents included Malah Manna, Malah Kura, Ba'ana Mannabe, Shetima Sunusi, Malah Abdu Gangama, Ba'Tujja Gangama, Zanna Riwalama, Mohammed Ali Kirdibe, and Kotere Gashina among others. Public musicians were also killed making the remaining to either renounce their occupation or go underground because the sect members considered singing, dancing, drumming, fluting, and piping as abominable acts. (Kullima, Garba and Babagana:2018).

There are other social norms which have also been impacted by the insurgency. As a result of the insurgency, displaced persons moved with families-men, women and children sometimes sharing one room. The men who were hitherto heads of their households and breadwinners became dependents on handouts from government agencies and Non-

Governmental Organizations (NGOs). This came to affect the respect they enjoyed previously from their families. In some instances, the women complained to the agencies that the men after receiving the foodstuff do not take it to their families. The agencies, therefore, stopped giving the foodstuffs to the men and gave the food vouchers to women making them a sort of being the breadwinners. The anti-social vices happening in the IDP camps like sex trade, sex for food, harassment of women are parts of the effects of the insurgency,

There is also other intangible impact of the insurgency like human rights abuse and illegal detentions. There are several allegations against security forces of human rights abuse and illegal detentions. At the peak of the insurgency in Maiduguri-2011 to 2014, whenever there was a shootout or explosion of IED in a place or ward, the military will raid that place and arrest all the young men within the premises. Some are likely to come back alive but others have not been heard of since. A lot are still under detention and are neither prosecuted nor released.

Another phenomenon which the insurgency brought was the influx of NGOs and International Non-Governmental Organizations into Borno. The scale of displacement of people has been unprecedented and has not been in the history of the country. About 2 million have been displaced stretching the ability of the government to manage the catastrophe. This made the intervention by the NGOs inevitable. The coming of the NGOs though helpful, had repercussions in the increase of cost of living in Maiduguri and increase in the price of house rent. There is also the unsubstantiated accusation against some of the NGOs of aiding the Boko Haram insurgents.

10. Conclusion

The struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state in the Northern Nigerian area dates back to the 19th century when Sheikh Othman b. Fodio established the Sokoto Caliphate and Borno, for centuries past, has been known to be an Islamic state. By the beginning of the 20th century, these states were conquered and brought under the British with new norms, laws and values. Since that time, once in a while, there emerged groups within the Muslim community demanding for the legitimization of the sharia law.

However, none of these groups became violent like the Boko Haram whose activities led to full-scale

insurgency. The epicenter of the group's activities was Borno, but the effects of the group was felt almost all over the country. The group that started as a preaching group metamorphosed into a monster that devastated more than half of Borno state and parts of Yobe and Adamawa states. The group was even daring enough to launch attacks in Kano, and in Abuja on the United Nations House and the Nigeria Police Headquarters.

It is estimated that in the 13 years of the Boko Haram insurgency, the North East region lost about 6.9 billion dollars about (3 trillion naira). About 5000 classrooms were destroyed, 800 municipal buildings were razed, including local government secretariats, prisons and traditional rulers' homes among others, 713 power distribution lines were destroyed and 1600 water points were vandalized. (Daily Trust, Friday, February 4, 2022). Borno, being the worst hit must have suffered more than half of the damages. There was also the colossal amount of money spent on the IDPs by both the government and Non-Governmental Organizations which ran into billions of Naira. This money could have been used for developmental projects which could have transformed the state tremendously.

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