



The Effects of Nigeria's Counter-Insurgency Strategy against Boko Haram on Human Security

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Abstract. For the past twenty years, the Nigerian state has been plagued by a variety of security issues and tensions, including civil unrest, ethno-religious violence and disturbances, youth restlessness, secession threats, militancy, terrorism, and insurgency, among others. Leading to counterinsurgency measures by the Nigerian state. The human security of the impacted communities in the northeast, however, has suffered as a result. It is on this note, therefore, that the study examined Nigeria's counterinsurgency strategy against Boko Haram on human security. The study adopted the qualitative research method in gathering data. The paper argues that although Nigeria's counter-insurgency tactics against Boko Haram are effective from the start, they do not crush and eradicate the movement; rather, they encourage a resurgence of the movement with increasingly complex waves of armed violence against the government and its security forces, as well as egregious violations of human rights and implications for the safety of the civilian population. The study concludes that a long-term solution to these security issues is unlikely as long as these counter-insurgency tactics are the sole means of combating the Boko Haram insurgency. The paper suggests that the government should create policies and strategies to lessen and eliminate social problems by limiting the activities of Boko Haram members in the northeast, through border control.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Counterinsurgency, Counterinsurgency Strategy, Human Security, Nigeria

1. Introduction

For over twenty years, the Nigerian state has been plagued by a variety of security issues and tensions, including civil unrest, ethno-religious violence and disturbances, youth restlessness, secession threats, militancy, terrorism, and insurgency, among others. These hurt the socioeconomic status of Nigerians and cast doubt on the country's ability to remain a single, independent nation. The most notable issue of the

present era is the insurgency carried out by the dreaded Boko Haram group, which began as a campaign of terror against the state and targeted security forces and their various formations (Eneje & Ogbu, 2022). The activities of the Boko Haram sect have now spread outside of Nigeria to her neighbors, posing a threat to both domestic and global security. Consistent violent attacks on security forces, civilians, churches and mosques, farms, media outlets, schools, and international organizations like the United Nations in 2011 have made several issues already facing the country, especially in the northeast, even worse (Cornell, 2019). The Boko Haram insurgency threatens national security, but it should be noted that in the post-Cold War era, the idea of national security has expanded beyond safeguarding citizens' lives and property by defending the state's territorial integrity against external threats (Adedoyin, 2013:455) to include defending citizens against the threats of diseases, hunger, unemployment, human rights violations, displacement and housing issues, conflict, political repression, and environmental degradation. The violence committed by Boko Haram, which has increased recently, has seriously jeopardized human security. Gilbert (2014) reports that more than 12,000 people have died and 8,000 have been maimed since the start of the insurgency. Due to farmers fleeing their farms out of fear of attack, particularly in the northern region, food insecurity has gotten worse.

Former Chief Justice of the Federation Dahiru Mustapha (quoted in Muzan, 2014, p. 218) aptly summed up the grim outlook of the Boko Haram insurgency trend when he observed that, more than at any other time in Nigeria's political history, the scourge of terrorism presents significant challenges to the state, slipping into anarchy that has taken on dangerous dimensions that may be beyond the ability of our security agencies to handle. This led to severe crises and threats to human security that had far-reaching political, social, and economic repercussions for the Nigerian people and government. In response to the severity of these issues, the Nigerian

government implemented a counterinsurgency strategy to put an end to the terror campaign and insurgency. By using the tools of the state apparatus, such as road blockades, stop and search operations, cordon-off operations, detention without trial, illegal arrests, torture, heavy security deployments, and human rights violations and abuses, the constitutional authorities employ ruthless force and other extrajudicial measures to quell uprisings, opposition, or any other forms of civil violence (Muzan, 2014). These measures frequently have major, profound effects on human security, even though they occasionally work well to contain the security threats of the day. The state always finds it harder to suppress or even include them at this point, despite its military might, because they produce violent, spontaneous reactions more quickly than in the past.

2. The Concept of Counterinsurgency

According to NATO doctrine, a counterinsurgency is an all-encompassing military and civilian endeavor to end an insurgency and resolve any fundamental grievances. Insurgents use or threaten to use force by irregular forces, groups, or individuals to force political change on those in authority. In addition to creating temporary fixes to secure the targeted population and alter disruptive behaviors, counterinsurgents also need to identify the causes of the unrest and discontent that are stoking the insurgency. Long-term operations are carried out by counterinsurgents to eradicate those causes of discontent. "Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes" is the definition of counterinsurgency. (US COIN, 2009). Given this, it is regarded as "an integrated set of political, economic, social, and security measures intended to create and maintain stable political, economic, and social structures, end and prevent the recurrence of armed violence, and resolve the underlying causes of an insurgency, to establish and sustain the condition necessary for lasting stability" (Moore, undated, p14).

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (2018), sees counterinsurgency as a set of tactics used to defeat insurgency, including the use of legal, political, economic, and security measures as well as the assistance of multinational partners. Therefore, it is a combination of all-encompassing military and civilian initiatives intended to address the underlying causes of insurgency while concurrently defeating and containing it (US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018, p. xiii). To assist the national government in excluding insurgents and gaining the support of the populace is

also a difficult, drawn-out process that frequently calls for combining capabilities, international humanitarian aid, and stability measures with those of multiple Inter-Agency partners (US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018, chapter III-2). Every circumstance that arises during this intricate process is distinct, has its context, and involves a unique set of factors, all of which must be thoroughly understood to develop a sound and all-encompassing strategy (US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018, chapter IV-p1).

The two main goals of the COIN strategy are to first seek out the state's mutual assistance to cripple terrorism and then to use members of the populace who could be important and helpful partners in destroying the ideology of terrorists (Gingell, 2021, p129). Given that prolonged violence necessitates a broad range of social, economic, informational, political, and military initiatives, Curtis (2020) contends that the COIN strategy concentrates on political or ideological mobilization. When the insurgents can connect their political and ideological objectives with legitimate public grievances to garner support from the general public, no single government initiative is adequate. Additionally, Kilcullen & Porter (2009, p. 12) note that COIN integrates a wide range of military and civilian agencies as a complex process. It frequently emphasizes security and population control, is people-centric, or is enemy-centric, emphasizing the defeat of insurgents.

There are essentially two main approaches to COIN: (i) Enemy Centric, which emphasizes defeating the enemy as the main objective and all other goals fall into place; and (ii) population-centric, which focuses on preserving or regaining the support of the populace while continuing direct military action against the insurgent organization. Therefore, the population should be protected and supported first, and everything else will fall into place (Kilcullen and Porter, 2009, 14). Similarly, Galula (cited in Oberoi, 2011, p. 6) contends that population-centric COIN is fundamentally a military operation, but that the protection of the civilian population, rather than the quantity of enemy casualties, determines its success. It demands patience from the government overseeing the conflict because it views the populace as the most significant center of gravity and prioritizes their protection, even at the expense of military force. In practice, though, a COIN campaign will rarely be solely enemy- or population-centric; rather, it will typically incorporate aspects of both, with the relative balance shifting over time (Kilcullen and Porter, 2009, p 15).

3. Boko Haram Insurgency: The Nigerian Experience

Since its rise to prominence in 2009, the Boko Haram sect has been at the vanguard of Nigeria's insecurity. One group that challenges Western education and culture is the insurgency group or sect known as Boko Haram. By doing this, the sect encourages violence, which ultimately results in the loss of lives and property. Its name encompasses this ideological position. The Hausa translation of the word "book" is "Boko." The Arabic term for the English word "forbidden" is "haram." When taken as a whole, these terms mean that Western education is sinful. Mohammed Yusuf established the fundamentalist sect in 2009 (Oghuvbu, 2021). The sect was initially just a collection of people whose ideologies ran counter to Borno State, Nigeria's political and Islamic structures. The group later distanced itself from the widespread adoption of the then-dominant Islamic beliefs. To vent their differences, the group killed Sheikh Ja'afar Mahmood Adam, a well-liked preacher and teacher at the Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, and then declared war on the government. Authorities at the state and federal levels clamped down on Yusuf and his group's activities after the sheikh was impudently assassinated (Oghuvbu, 2024; Zango, 2024). The group became more violent in their attacks after Yusuf was ultimately killed under mysterious circumstances.

Salkida contended that since 2010, when Boko Haram's violence increased, its attacks have spread outside of Nigeria. The sects target mosques, churches, police stations, and schools. Chibok, Borno state, saw the kidnapping of over 276 schoolgirls. About 2,000 people are thought to have died in Nigeria as a result of Boko Haram. Yobe, Adamawa, and Borno states proclaimed states of emergency as a result of this government's declaration of war on terrorists and its escalation in 2012 and 2013. Despite this, Oghuvbu (2021) claims that Boko Haram has persisted in causing chaos. "Millions of Nigerians have been forced to leave their homes in the northeastern region of the country due to Boko Haram (Oghuvbu, 2024)." The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has resulted in widespread displacement since 2014. Abdulazeez claims that as of October 2015, "roughly two million people were displaced due to insurgency in the states of Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa alone." In reaction to attacks in displacement camps, the Nigerian military and the Joint Task Force comprising Chad, Niger, Benin, and Cameroon stepped up counter-insurgency operations, according to the Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). 279,000 people were ultimately displaced. As of 2017, there were 1,707,000 internally displaced

people. Marama claims that after 13 people were killed by Boko Haram on October 2, 2018, IDPs in Borno state were compelled to leave their camps (Zango, 2024).

The sect grew increasingly violent and aggressive over time. The attack on a secondary school in Chibok, which led to the kidnapping of 329 schoolgirls, is notable among its many attacks and occasional murders. Over 100,000 people have been killed as a result of the severity of its attacks, and at least 244,000 have sought safety in nearby nations. The sect expanded its operations into the Lake Chad Basin, posing a threat to Niger, Chad, and Cameroon's security (Amalu, 2015; Zango, 2024). The Nigerian government, through its Armed Forces, has waged a long war against the insurgent sect in response to the threat it posed. The Nigerian military has been sent to the northeastern region of the nation to combat the wave of unrest brought on by this group. The nation's military has carried out several operations, most notably Operation Lafiya Dole. After Operation Zaman Lafiya failed, the Nigerian military launched Operation Lafiya Dole. The goal of the operation was to take on and degrade Boko Haram (Amalu, 2015). The Former Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Tukur Butatai, oversaw the operation from his command center in Maiduguri. The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a militia established to defend civilian communities against the terrorist sect, is one of the other initiatives by nations in the Lake Chad Basin.

4. The Theoretical Framework for Human Security

Since the concept's widespread introduction, there has been ongoing discussion regarding what constitutes human security. In 1945, the United Nations (UN) established "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" as its guiding principles (Ogele, 2022). This concept's vague definition presents a challenge for academics studying human security. A universal definition of "safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression" and "protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life" was proposed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1994. The establishment of the Commission on Human Security (CHS) was regarded as a major turning point from a historical perspective. The commission's objectives were to: (a) increase awareness of and support for human security; (b) further develop the concept as an operational tool; and (c) outline a detailed implementation plan (Ogele, 2022). In this way, protecting people from serious and widespread dangers and circumstances is the concept's objectivity.

The idea of human security has been defined from both a broad and a specific standpoint. Human security, according to the broad definition promoted by the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report, is "freedom from fear and freedom from want (cited in Rahman, 2019)." It also explains the two facets of human security: first, protection against long-term dangers like hunger, illness, and repression; and second, defense against abrupt and painful disruptions in daily routines, whether in homes, workplaces, or communities. Economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security are the seven dimensions of human security, according to the reports. The central idea of human security revolves around the elimination of fear and want, and as such, (Danjibo, 2013:490) asserts that "as far as most citizens are concerned, the basics of food, shelter, education, health, and freedom are all they want (Chukwueloke, & Oghuvbu, 2020)." Thus, the 1999 UNDP-Human Development Report's broad viewpoint is adopted in this work.

Human security is a people-centered phenomenon that centers on defending a particular people's and their communities' lives, means of subsistence, and human values from threats and/or danger. As a result, it is quantified in terms of how safe individuals and their communities are from physical harm, violence, and/or attacks, as well as how stable and orderly they are. Human security, then, is concerned with the ability to recognize threats, want to prevent them when feasible, and lessen their impact when they do materialize (Ogele, 2022). Therefore, it entails assisting victims in overcoming the effects of the pervasive insecurity brought on by armed conflict, human rights abuses, and severe underdevelopment. Because it addresses how people live and breathe in a society, how safely and freely they can exercise their many choices, how much access they have to markets and social opportunities, whether they live in peace or conflict, and how confident they can feel that the opportunities they enjoy one day won't be completely lost the next, it is viewed as people-centered (UNESCO, 2008, p3). Human security is therefore purposefully protective since it acknowledges that communities and individuals are endangered by circumstances that are completely out of their control; it is preventative rather than reactive and responsive rather than inflexible. Human security is therefore people-centered rather than threat-centered (Chukwueloke, & Oghuvbu, 2020).

5. Practical Applications of Human Security

Since the UNDP defined human security, the concept has embraced two key elements within the security dimension: "freedom from wants" and "freedom from fear." According to that perspective, empowerment and practice are more in line with human security in practice. The Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) defines empowerment as the application of policies by governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector to protect people from threats outside of their control, empowerment entails fostering development at the local and regional levels to improve human security. The "strategies that the concept of human security emphasizes empowerment and protection and aims to enable individuals to develop resilience in the face of difficult situations cited in (Ilo, Akanmu, & Osman, 2023).

Nonetheless, there are disagreements and objections to the notion of human security. Tamminem (2018) highlights the unresolved conflict between the narrow strategy of "freedom from fear" and the more expansive strategy of "freedom from wants." It's also unclear how states contribute to security or endanger citizens' lives. Furthermore, there aren't enough analytical tools or measurement systems for human security. Similar to universal human rights, Booth (2007) contends that human security may cause a country's security agenda to prioritize things incorrectly. On the other hand, proponents of human security argue that it has caused security studies to broaden their scope to encompass threats to people's everyday lives, such as crime, hunger, drought, and diseases. Additional security measures, like the ban on anti-personal mines, have been made possible by this wider viewpoint. Japan and the UN have adopted the broad definition, highlighting non-military threats. The more restrictive definition, which emphasizes protecting people from war and violence, is preferred by Western governments, including those of many EU nations (Ilo, Akanmu, & Osman, 2023). The broad definition runs the risk of losing its analytical component by viewing different health issues as security threats, while proponents of the restricted definition think it can be used more successfully as a foreign policy tool.

6. Research Methods

The study discussed the problems and difficulties associated with the Nigerian counterinsurgency strategy adopted by the Nigerian state against Boko Haram on human security. The study made use of content analysis of secondary data collected from online sources, unpublished theses, textbooks, journal

articles, and book chapters. The current study examines the issues and challenges related to the counterinsurgency strategy that the Nigerian government has implemented against Boko Haram using an exploratory research design. Data obtained from secondary sources, such as published and unpublished materials, including previous publications (including e-journals), can be analyzed using thematic analysis.

7. The Nigerian Government Counterinsurgency Strategy against Boko Haram

Nigeria's COIN strategy is essentially enemy-centric kinetic warfare that uses a large combination of air and land-based coercive forces to destroy Boko Haram insurgents. Its objectives are listed as follows: Preserve civil order; defend the civilian populace; defeat and eradicate the rebels; seize Sambisa Forest and the lost areas; apprehend or destroy Boko Haram leaders; and eradicate Boko Haram and its remnants (logistics and infrastructure). Shodunke (2021) cites Drukhan on page 68. Heavy-handed tactics and violations of human rights are generally part of the adopted strategy, which exacerbates the situation by alienating civilians and fostering sympathy for the enemy. The Nigerian security forces were charged with carrying out summary executions in response to attacks, burning homes, arbitrary arrests of young men on the streets and shooting them, and needless, protracted detentions in which the majority of the young detainees died (Noakes, 2014; Zango, 2024). The way the Nigerian government has responded to and managed the Boko Haram insurgency has greatly fueled the group's radicalization and driven it to the other extreme.

Both the extrajudicial execution of Boko Haram leader Muhammad Yusuf and the shooting of Boko Haram members during a funeral procession in July 2009, shortly before the July uprising, were interpreted as declarations of war. Since then, the movement has recognized that the civilian population is essential to their safety and ability to successfully operate against the JTF; consequently, the JTF has turned to exacting revenge on the entire civilian population. Despite the community's awareness of Boko Haram's role in atrocities, the group has gained support due to this indiscriminate response. Because of the state's incapacity to protect its citizens and the JTF's inability to distinguish between civilians and combatants, Boko Haram's confidence in their efforts and membership numbers have increased (ICRP Report, 2020, p6). According to Antigha (2017), public perceptions, legitimacy, and support play a significant role in

determining the success of counterinsurgency operations both domestically and internationally. However, the military's ruthless use of force and other extrajudicial tactics have an impact on operations generally. Another development was the creation of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTf) in June 2013 to support COIN operations in response to the security challenges posed by insurgent activities in Borno state since 2009. This led to the government security forces losing control of the insurgency and the insurgents' blatant destruction of property and lives. The military joint task force's response to insurgent violence has been characterized by the indiscriminate and excessive use of force; they have been known to shoot and arrest people randomly while also occasionally setting homes and shops on fire in areas where terror activities have taken place (Osakwe & Audu, 2017, P4).

To put an end to the Boko Haram insurgency, the Nigerian government, particularly the Special Joint Task Force (SJTF), which consists of coordinated operations by the Army, Navy, Air Force, Police, DSS, Immigration, and DIA, has implemented a counterinsurgency strategy since 2009. This strategy includes both repressive and non-repressive tactics, including stop and search, periodic patrol, arrest, detention, and politicizing. Operation Flush, Operation Restore Order (1, 2, 3), Operation Deep Punch, Operation Boyona, Operation Ruwan Wuta I&I, Operation Gama Aiki, Operation Zaman Lafiya, Operation Last Hold, Operation Lafiya Dole (later renamed Operation Hadin Kai), and Operation Tura ta kai Bango are among the numerous operations coded under various titles. To eliminate the transnational threats of the Boko Haram insurgency, a regional initiative was also started in cooperation with members of the Lake Chad Commission, which resulted in the creation of the Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF) (Zango, 2024).

By taking the audacious decision to support the COIN, President Muhammadu Buhari gave the conflict a more progressive dimension in keeping with the federal government's commitment to combating insurgency. He oversaw the release of \$21 million of the \$100 million pledged for the efficient functioning and success of the Multinational Joint Taskforce, which was first carried out in 2011 with a contingent of 25,000 troops and subsequently expanded to roughly 100,000 troops (Shodunke, 2021, p70). Specifically, since 2013, Nigerian COIN has carried out 5,390 operational missions, including 2,648 ground attacks, 1,479 airlifts, 1,443 ISR, and 1,448 airstrikes against the insurgents. The agency has also launched thousands of aerial bombings and sorties against the insurgents. As a result, beginning in

December 2014, COIN was able to retake a large number of areas from the rebels, demolishing their hiding places in October 2017 (Shodunke, 2021, p70).

8. The Nigerian Counterinsurgency Strategy and Operations Effects on Human Security

Corruption in COIN (Counterinsurgency) is a significant obstacle to Nigeria's COIN strategy and operations. According to reports, Nigeria spent more than \$3.9 billion on weapons purchases, of which \$2 billion may have been embezzled by dishonest politicians and not put to use, sparking the Dasuki-Gate investigation (Shodunke, 2021, p73). Similar to this, Zango (2024) lists the following as the main issues with the Nigerian COIN strategy: unclear policies to protect civilians; inadequate troop deployment and unwillingness to fight; no clear distinction between civilians and insurgents; lack of professionalism and accountability; inadequate training and equipment; no complaints mechanism; no due process; unlawful detention; poor communications and community relations; civilians' perception of corruption and mistrust of security forces; and inadequate intelligence and information gathering.

In Borno state, the use of 8,000 troops in Operation Restore Order to fight the insurgents led to extrajudicial executions, dragnet arrests, and the intimidation of defenseless civilians. As a result, the public began to sympathize with the insurgents, who gradually deceived the local populace to foster resistance to the government (Onuoha in Shodunke, 2021, p73-74). Unfortunately, the terrible security situation is made worse, especially in those areas, by the security forces' tyranny and abusive tactics. This is because the security strategy implemented in that political context has given security forces the authority to engage Boko Haram insurgents in any way, they see fit, frequently at the expense of the people they have vowed to defend (Dietrich, 2015, p29). Given this, Felbab-Brown (2018, p. 13) laments the fact that the Nigerian police and military's COIN policy has resulted in widespread and serious human rights violations, insecurity, suffering, and displacement. Especially before 2015, when the COIN strategy in clearing operations, which frequently amounted to violent retaliation by the Nigerian military, the entire village was punished collectively for allegedly harboring Boko Haram militants or having fallen under its control. Villagers who were unable to escape to the bush were killed at random on suspicion of being Boko Haram members (Zango, 2024). Others include

cases in which a large group of women and children were taken to detention.

Numerous instances of torture and extrajudicial executions by COIN forces have been documented. In this regard, they executed over 1000 people between 2013 and 2014, occasionally as many as 100 every day. Additionally, it has been reported that the majority of COIN operations in urban areas have involved the military regularly shooting young men while aggressively cordoning off and searching homes. Accordingly, the Nigerian military executed 640 boys and men in March 2014, the majority of whom were recaptured detainees, in retaliation for Boko Haram attacks on Giwa Barack, where they freed some detainees (Felbab-Brown, 2018, p. 14). In particular, during clearing operations alongside the military, the Nigerian military reportedly uses civilian joint task force units (CJTF) as spies to find Boko Haram associates in the IDP camps. They also independently set up checkpoints, patrol streets, inspect suspicious vehicles, and question people under duress, torture, human rights violations, and occasionally death (Felbab-Brown, 2018, p. 14). To refute the extent of the CJTF's egregious abuses, approximately 99 of its members were detained in 2013 for unauthorized attacks on suspected Boko Haram insurgents in Borno state's Baga areas. Likewise, 21 CJTF members were detained between January and April 2014 for unlawfully killing Boko Haram suspects while they were in their care. Similarly, the 2016 Country Rights Practice Report bemoaned the continued unchecked arbitrary mass arrests and detention in the northeastern region of Nigeria under appalling and life-threatening conditions. More than 120 boys between the ages of 5 and 16 were thus detained incommunicado in a single cell, according to the report. Furthermore, since 2009, security forces have arbitrarily detained about 20,000 people in the area; of these, over 7000 have perished from malnutrition, suffocation, and diseases brought on by overcrowding, a lack of medical care, and the use of fumigation chemicals in unventilated cells (Felbab-Brown, 2018, p. 14).

The Amnesty International Report (2014) states that the Nigerian military and Boko Haram killed over 4,000 people in the conflict in 2014 alone, including over 600 extrajudicial executions that took place after the Giwa Barrack Attack in Maiduguri on March 14. The report also revealed that a disturbing video image showed the Nigerian military and CJTF slitting several detainees' throats with blades before disposing of them in an open mass grave. Another unsettling event occurred on April 16 and 17, 2013, when the Nigerian military raided Baga town and purposefully shot and

killed locals, destroying homes and property in the process. The locals also reported that a soldier had been killed and five others were wounded. The assaults Satellite photos of the town show that more than 200 people were killed and that more than 2,227 buildings—the great majority of which were occupied by residents—were destroyed. Accordingly, the report bemoaned the fact that although the Nigerian military had an obligation to defend the populace and itself against Boko Haram attacks, the evidence from Baga suggests that they did more damage than good (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Furthermore, this sparked backlash from the general public and international community, particularly from civil society groups that support human rights and causes like Amnesty International, which accused the Nigerian Army of participating in COIN operations in the country's northeast in its 2014 Annual Report. This is due to the disclosure that Nigerian security forces engaged in serious human rights abuses and illegal activities that violate international law while battling Boko Haram. The 'screening of subjects' was frequently followed by their alleged extrajudicial executions (Felbab-Brown, 2018, p. 14).

In this context, on July 23, 2013, Nigerian soldiers working with the CJTF entered the Bama Central Market and instructed all of the local adult men to assemble in one spot and remove their clothing. They were later divided into two groups. The 300 men in the first group were judged to be innocent, while the 35 men in the second group, who were dressed as Boko Haram members, were asked to lie down on the ground, severely beaten, macheted, loaded onto a truck, and transported to military barracks. On July 29, 2013, they were returned to their communities, where they were shot dead and their bodies dumped (Amnesty International Report, 2014). As a result of flagrant abuses and violations of human rights, the COIN experienced a severe setback, and the US government was asked to prohibit the sale of weapons to Nigeria in 2014 (Omotuyi cited in Shodunke, 2021). Given this situation, a study on the civilian population's perception of the COIN security forces found that people's perceptions shifted from the government's role as a security provider to that of an aggressor. In actuality, the military has far too frequently defined its mission in terms of attempting to kill terrorists rather than attempting to save the lives of civilians. This has given Boko Haram insurgents some sympathy, which has made it easier for them to recruit civilians (Dietrich, 2015, p5). According to Dietrich (2015), the research concluded that the COIN forces have failed in three main areas: (i) protecting vulnerable communities from violence; (ii) preventing collateral damage during counterinsurgency

operations with Boko Haram; and (iii) and most importantly, directly targeting civilian populations through indiscriminate targeting of youth, sexual violence, property destruction, unlawful detention, harassment, torture, and excessive use (Dietrich, 2015, p5) of force that results in injuries and deaths.

9. Conclusion

The primary goal of this study is to demonstrate how the Boko Haram insurgency negatively affects Nigerian citizens' human security. The study found out that even though Nigeria's counter-insurgency strategy, which is essentially enemy-centric, is effective from the beginning, it fails to completely defeat and eliminate the movement and instead encourages a renewed uprising of the movement with more sophisticated waves of armed violence against the state and its security apparatus. The violence against the Nigerian state and the people in the northeast has reached monumental proportions. There is little chance of a long-term resolution and sustainable peace and security in the northeastern part of Nigeria as long as these counterinsurgency tactics are the sole tactic used to combat the Boko Haram insurgency.

10. Recommendations

From the findings of the study, the following recommendations are suggested to curb Boko Haram Insurgency:

The sustainability and recurrence of the insurgency in the future can be avoided by creating policies and strategies to lessen and eliminate social problems. To combat Boko Haram, the government must also implement fresh counterinsurgency tactics. Since the group could not be stopped by the previous, well-thought-out plan. According to the studies, to effectively combat the insurgency, the government should implement a hybrid doctrine approach. To limit the activities of Boko Haram members in the northeast, border control is also necessary. Given that Nigeria shares borders with its neighbors—Chad, Niger, and Cameroon—this should be a multilateral strategy.

To improve Nigeria's human security and put an end to the insurgency, the study argues that to successfully fight the Boko Haram insurgency, the Nigerian government must address many issues. First providing efficient leadership and good governance. Similarly, corruption and ineffective governance by Nigerian present and past leaders were also found to be contributing factors to the threat's sustainability.

Therefore, having a strong leadership plan will aid in eradicating the nation's corruption problems. Additionally, all of the nation's institutions and sectors will begin operating following their potential mandate when there is good governance. In a similar vein, the government must deal with the nation's social and economic problems. These problems include illiteracy, unemployment, and poverty. These are the elements that give the Boko Haram sect an advantage when it comes to enlisting new members to further its goals.

The necessities for human survival should be provided for by the government. To increase food production, investments must be made in the agricultural sector; more fully equipped healthcare centers must be constructed; education must be provided free of charge to all, at least for primary school students; and more high-quality schools must be established. Both compensating those impacted by the insurgency and providing suitable housing for internally displaced people are imperative. Give the populace sufficient defense against both external and internal attackers, and make sure the security forces entrusted with these duties don't commit the same crimes or violate the human rights of the populace.

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