



## Assessment of Godfatherism and Internal Democracy on Infrastructural Development in Edo State, Nigeria

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**Abstract.** Godfatherism is a means through which the leadership of political parties is imposing the surrogate candidates into political positions for the purpose of serving interest on their behalf. Godfatherism and internal democracy in Edo State end up in rift to suspension, political conflict to defections, violence to civil unrest and litigations in the courts of law which have negative impact on infrastructural development. The study examines an assessment of godfatherism and internal democracy in Edo State. The target area of the study includes State Party Executive of All Progressive Congress (APC) and (PDP), Local Government Executive APC and PDP, Electorates APC and PDP, INEC, Academies and Civil Society. The study adopted analytical and descriptive research types and the study used primary and secondary sources of gathered data. The objective of the study is to examine the factors that contributed to the trend of godfatherism in Edo State. Findings revealed that, godsons' preference for political survival above administration has a detrimental effect on public services and infrastructure. It also revealed that political parties' financial limitations encourage corruption, erode internal democracy. Therefore, the study recommended that, electioneering campaigning funds should come directly from consolidated funds established by federal government; political parties in Edo State should implement transparent and democratic systems in candidate selection to eliminate the power of godfathers and the state government and relevant stake holders should develop long-term strategies for sustainable infrastructure development in Edo State.

**Keywords:** Edo State, Godfatherism, Internal Democracy and Nigeria.

### 1. Introduction

Since Nigeria got her independence, political surrogate or political godfatherism has been the tradition of politics and invariably leads to political crisis, such as godfather-godson conflicts, corruption and internal political conflict. Democracy, as a moral and legitimate means of governing a nation, has spread to many parts of the globe but it's yet to take root in Nigeria most especially in Edo State. That was why Ahmed & Ali (2019) opined that power of incumbency, influence, political thug, money politics, lack of political knowledge, selfishness, greediness, lack of publicity, over ambition, nepotism and politics of regionalization are among the factors that led to the politics of godfatherism in Nigeria. When the roads between the godfathers and godsons become rough and there will be tension all over the places, litigation in competent court of law, civil unrest, disunity and disharmony.

Edo State witnessed an uproar, rift, tensions and defection as a result of godfatherism and internal democracy that taken the centre stage between Adams Oshiomhole (godfather) and Godwin Obaseki (godson). Edo State is a state that no longer holds polls concurrently with general election. After Adam Oshiomhole second term in office as a governor, the battle to the seat of No 1 in the state was between the APC and PDP. Godwin Obaseki was the main challenger while Osagie Ize-Iyamu was a close ally of Oshiomhole. Both were handpicked by the godfather

and imposed on the party on the day of primary and Obaseki was declared winner of the primary and became governor after governorship election in 2016 with the strong support from Oshiomhole and Oshiomhole became the national chairman of APC. The marriage between Oshiomhole and Obaseki could not hold again and began to sink as a result of who control the party and who control the governance.

Therefore, Oshiomhole (godfather) was suspended by local wards executive and Obaseki (godson) and try as much as possible to use court to suspend Oshiomhole as the national chairman of the APC. In response, Obaseki was disqualified from APC governorship primary election because of academic credentials. Also, Obaseki defected to People's Democratic Party (PDP) in other to get his re-election ambition. Edo State Assembly inaugurated nine (9) out of twenty-four (24) members elected in other to weaken the strength of the godfather and Obaseki sacked eight (8) commissioners loyal to the godfather. Federal High Court in Port Harcourt stopped the National Assembly from interfering in the affairs of Edo State House of Assembly and vote of no confidence was passed by eighteen (18) Chairmen of the State Local Government Chapter on Oshiomhole and the House of Assembly sacked twelve (12) out of fifteen (15) lawmakers elected who were excluded from inauguration.

In the same vein, Godwin Obaseki and Phillip Shaibu were given waiver to become candidates for PDP governorship election as governor and deputy governor. Both were the governor and deputy governor respectively after defected from APC and PDP after the governorship election in the state. Invariably, before the end of the second term of Godwin Obaseki and Phillip Shaibu political marriage could not again and began to sink. Godwin Obaseki took another deputy governor Marvellous Omobayo after the 18 State House of Assembly found Phillip Shaibu wanting of gross misconduct and impeached him. Phillip Shaibu went court and Godwin Obaseki also went to court.

At end of the litigation and counter litigation the court ruled in favour of Phillip Shaibu as authentic and recognised deputy governor. During the rift between Godwin Obaseki and Phillip Shaibu, Phillip Shaibu defected from PDP to APC in other to reconcile with Oshiomhole who left four years ago. This was captured by (Igbini, & Okolie 2020:93) when he reinstated that multiple political parties, frequent and competitive elections, which would otherwise be called irreducible minimum requirements for democratic rule, have not resulted in a corresponding

flourishing of fundamental liberal ideals that are vital to democracy's survival.

### 1.1 Statement of the Problem

In politics, according to the saying of Niccolo Machiavelli, the ends justify the means' some of the aspirants/candidates who might have money to finance their political activities and the failure of the parties to organized the political manifestoes due to financial incapacitation will run to the wealthy individual that the parties were built around to donate and subsequently dominate the party structures.

Imposition of candidates motivates the internal conflicts of political parties and thereby weakens both the development of the state and internal democracies. Galles (2011) contends that godfatherism may not consider the important of putting all the tenets of democracy into action rather the personal aggrandizement.

It has however been argued that various policies of the parties, campaigning and funding of the parties always cause troubles, rifts and tensions between godfathers and godsons and political party leaders Majekodunmi & Awosika (2013) and this may be due to the fact that godfather, godsons, stakeholders, gladiators and political party leaders always championing the course of getting who get what when and how according to Lasswell.

It has been debated that self-finance, wealthy aspirants and absence of strategies of political parties' influence party decisions on candidates Osayi (2015) and this may be due to the fact that there are gladiators, stakeholders and hierarchy of power that can determine what happen and what come to pass in the political parties.

### 1.2 Research Objectives

The general aim of the study is to do an assessment of godfatherism and internal democracy in Edo State while the specific objectives are to:

- examine the factors that contributed to the trend of godfatherism in Edo State.
- evaluate the role of party internal democracy on the relationship between the godfathers and the godsons in Edo State.
- investigate the impact of party financial incapacitation on internal democracy and how it affected infrastructural development in Edo State.

### 1.3 Research Questions

The study tended to answer the following research questions:

- What are the factors that contributed to the trend of godfatherism in Edo State?
- What are the roles of party internal democracy on the relationship between the godfathers and the godsons in Edo State?
- How does the degree of financial incapacitation affect internal democracy and infrastructural development in Edo State?

### 1.4 Research Hypotheses

*H<sub>01</sub>*: Party financial incapacitation of political parties has no significant relationship on infrastructural development in Edo and Kaduna States.

*H<sub>02</sub>* : Imposition of candidates has no significant relationship on infrastructural development in Edo and Kaduna States.

## 2. Conceptual Clarification

### 2.1 Democracy

World Bank (2017) argued that democracy is a form of government, a way of life, a goal or ideal and political philosophy. They opined that democracy can be referred to a country that has a democratic form of government and the word democracy means rule by the people. Seeing democracy as a way of life is questionable because a way of life includes culture and culture is total way of life such as dressing, eating, reading, dancing, speaking, moving, reasoning and others. Does democracy carry all these features? To what level has been democracy imbibe the features of dancing and eating?

### 2.2 Godfatherism

Alabi & Sakariyau (2013) opined that godfatherism in Nigeria particularly in its current form and character is distributive in nature. They saw political godfatherism as one of the factors that embedded democratic setting in Nigeria since first republic. They concluded that the recent activities of some Nigerian godfathers to be likened to attributes of mafianism and see the existence of godfathers as balance of power in the democracy. It is obvious that the character of godfathers has to do with distributive political and administrative power to the godsons and this singular act always end up in tension and violence between the godfathers and the godsons. Invariably, godfatherism is one of the factors that retrogressed the democratic

setting and practices in Nigeria as Alabi & Sakariyau (2013) emphasized. The recent activities of godfathers are more than mafianism and cannot in any way balance political power in a democracy. What power does godson has in a state? What power does godfather has in a state? Is there any other power apart from counter balancing power from the godfathers or godsons? These are fundamental questions to be addressed before we can agree with Alabi & Sakariyau (2013) on godfatherism as a balance of power in a democracy.

### 2.3 Imposition of Candidate

Ogbe (2015) opined that Nigeria democracy is threatened by candidates' imposition by some powerful party leaders due to lack of political parties' internal democracy. He argued that though political party has made formation of representative democracy easier and possible via the instrumentality of election yet he sees Nigeria's democracy to produce incompetent leaders as a result of the imposition of candidate. Stakeholders, gladiators, godfathers and godsons imposed their preferred candidates on the political parties because of their wealth of experience in politicking. They are so powerful to the extent that they determine, shape and control all activities in the political parties.

### 2.4 Internal Democracy

Sindre (2016) emphasised that internal democracy is to be considered as an important factor of former rebel movements adoption to democracy. It is not only rebel movements that embracing internal democracy. Internal democracy is being embraced by clubs, societies, political parties and religious organization in their respective jurisdictions.

### 2.5 Political Parties

Berger (2017) explained that the principle of self-government through political parties as the corner stone of democracy has come to be regarded as a solution to the problem of nationality. He opines that the principle of nationality entails the acceptance of the idea of popular government. He went on to see the importance of principle of nationality to be undeniable. To what extent does self-government through political parties serve as corner stone of democracy? Majority of political parties across the Africa, particularly in Nigeria revolve around ethnicity with only a few preaching and carrying the element of nationality. In essence, political parties characterize ethnic coloration and the issues of nationality are nowhere to be found.

### 3. Empirical Review

Nkwede & Ibeogu (2024) wrote on political godfatherism and governance in a developing democracy: Insight from Nigeria. They used descriptive and content analytical methods to carry out their study. Their study discovered that godfatherism has threatened the country's nascent democracy since 1999. However, godfatherism did not threaten nascent democracy in Nigeria alone, godfatherism makes governance problematic in Nigeria and it can be kind of spillover effect in other neighbouring countries.

Opone & Ikuni (2024) wrote on godfatherism and Nigeria 2015 general election: The case of Delta State. They used historical and analytical methods to carry out their study. One of their findings was that forcing the godfathers out of politics may be dangerous. The gap in their study is that if all relevant stakeholders in politics are called to order by observing all the tenets of democracy systematically godfatherism will be ameliorated.

Sapele & Jeko (2024) wrote on the implications of godfatherism and eliocentricism in Nigeria politics for national development. They used secondary means to carry out their study. Their finding was that godfatherism has very negative consequences and if necessary, steps are not taken, Nigeria's quest for sustainable national development would only be a mirage. The gap in their study is that they compared godfatherism with eliocentricism and their study focused national development whereas impact of godfatherism and internal democracy on infrastructural development compared Edo and Kaduna States.

Akpama & Ayomola (2021) wrote on internal democracy and political violence in Rivers and Bayelsa States Nigeria (2010 – 2020). They used qualitative method to carry out their study. Their finding was that internal democracy had effect on political violence in Rivers and Bayelsa States. The study on impact of godfatherism and internal democracy on infrastructural development in some selected states in Nigeria compared Edo and Kaduna States.

Yahaya & Abba (2021) wrote on an overview of the implication of godfatherism in Nigeria politics. They used qualitative and descriptive methods to carry out their study. They discovered that godfatherism lead to inter party and intra party defections among the political parties and party members in Nigeria. The gap in their study is that godfatherism lead to

litigations, civil unrest, disharmony and disunity among the political parties and parties' members.

Asaju (2023) wrote on infrastructural development and development administration: A retrospective. He used descriptive qualitative research and secondary data. His finding was that various infrastructures in Nigeria are in deplorable state and efforts at building modern infrastructure are still very insignificant. His study supposed to be infrastructural development and development of administration and economic because separating or removing economic from administration is an exercise in futility.

Koulaoum (2023) wrote on digital infrastructural development and inclusive growth in sub-Saharan Africa. He used four indicators of digital infrastructures and their components scope to determine their effects on inclusive growth. His finding was that inclusive growth in sub-Saharan Africa is enhanced by the number of individuals using the internet, the number of fixed broadband and subscribers, fixed telephone and mobile cellular subscription per 100 adults. He finding was that digital infrastructures enhance the level of inclusive growth in sub-Saharan Africa economies irrespective of whether the countries belong to the lower, middle- and upper-income groups. What will be the fate of numerous individuals in the rural areas that could not avoid the internet, fixed telephone and mobile cellular subscription serve as gap to be filled.

Piechowicz & Szymanek (2024) wrote on stabilisation of loose soils as part of sustainability development of road infrastructure. They used descriptive and analytical methods to carry out their study. Their finding was that soil stabilisation technologies significantly improve road strength and durability. The study on impact of godfatherism and internal democracy on infrastructural development in some selected states in Nigeria compared Edo and Kaduna States using road construction and water supply as reference.

Nickdoost & Jauad (2024) wrote on a comparative index framework for qualitative resilience assessment of road infrastructure system. They used case study to carry out their study. Their finding was that the framework can effectively corresponding roots capture and track progress/ detritions in various resilience aspects. Their study was basically on road infrastructure while the study on impact of godfatherism and internal democracy on infrastructural development in some selected states in Nigeria used road construction and water supply as reference points.

#### 4. Theoretical Review

##### 4.1 Participatory Theory

The propounded of participatory theory of democracy was J. J. Rousseau in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and later promoted and developed by John Stuart Mill and G. D. H. Cole. The theory implied that political participation is indispensable for a just society. They emphasized that citizens have the opportunity to be involved in decision making on matter that affect their life. There are eight degrees of participation in the ladder of citizens participation. One is manipulation where party primaries among political parties are purely rubber stamp because the party leaders together with godfather had preferred candidate that will eventual emerged. Two is therapy where internal democracy is all about party supremacy anything outside party supremacy is nowhere to be found among the political party in developing countries.

Three is informing where the beauty of party primary is to inform the party members about the way forward to establish a true democracy through putting into practice what the party intend to teach and practice when they win the election but it is other way round. Four is consultation where there should be adequate consultation from the party leaders, godfathers, godsons, stakeholders and gladiators before, during and after party primaries but consultation is minimal as regard internal democracy of the political party. Five is placation where citizens are giving limited degree of influence in the process of internal democracy of appointing, nominating and electing the flag bearer of the party. Six is partnership where there is room for negotiation of better deals and opportunity which may be in form of positions, money (dollars and other hard currency) in exchange for full degree of participation. Seven is delegated power where the electoral body that has been saddled with the responsibility of oversee the conduct of the primary through the delegated authority collaborated with the dictate from the party leaders and the godfathers. Eight is citizens control where the level of citizens control during the internal democracy of political party is not feasible at all. There is no room for any control from the masses, citizens, electorates and party members, the controls come from the party leaders, godfather, godson, stakeholders, gladiators, electoral body, courts and of course the security officials. Some of the defect of the participatory theory are the participations are purely rubber stamp. There is minimal consultation during the participation. Disbelief in citizens capabilities to bear the greater responsibility and feasibility of participatory is not encouraging.

The knowledge of the theory helped us to understand that political parties is all about equitable distribution of positions, executives, resources, powers, and the recognition of the minorities. Also, it helped us to understand that there are different powers in political parties and how these different powers interchangeably and perform functions in the political parties.

#### 5. Methodology

Research designs for the study were analytical and descriptive research types. Questionnaire, structured interview and focus groups discussion were used The study population included State Party Executive of All Progressive Congress (APC) ) forty five (45); State Party Executive of People's Democratic Party (PDP) forty two (42); Local Government Executive APC thirty (30); Local Government Executive PDP thirty (30); Electorates APC thirty (30); Electorates PDP thirty (30); INEC ten (10); Academies from State University sixteen (16), Civil Society fifteen (15) from Edo State Nigeria making a total population of two hundred and forty eight (248). The samples size was one hundred and two (102) using Taro Yamane's formular. State Party Executive of All Progressive Congress (APC) ) eighteen (18); State Party Executive of People's Democratic Party (PDP) seventeen (17); Local Government Executive APC twelve (12); Local Government Executive PDP twelve (12); Electorates twelve APC (12); Electorates twelve PDP (12); INEC five (05); Academies eight (08), Civil Society six (6) from Edo State Nigeria making a total of one hundred and two (102).

Respondents for the selected interview for the study included party chairmen of All Progressive Congress (APC) and People's Democratic Party (PDP) four (4), party secretaries of All Progressive Congress (APC) and People's Democratic Party (PDP) four (4), senatorial leaders of All Progressive Congress (APC) and People's Democratic Party (PDP) three (3), religious leaders three (3) and traditional rulers three (3) from Edo State Nigeria making a total of seventeen (17). Respondents selected for the focus group discussion for the study included old and educated male and female ten (10), old and uneducated male and female ten (10), youth and educated male and female ten (10), and youth and uneducated male and female ten (10) from Edo State Nigeria making a total of forty (40).

Instrument the study relied upon was questionnaire on assessment of godfatherism and internal democracy in Edo State Nigeria (AGIDIESNQ) while instrument

used for structured interview was assessment of godfatherism and internal democracy in Edo State Nigeria (AGIDIESNSIQ) and instrument used for the focus groups discussion was assessment of godfatherism and internal democracy in Edo State Nigeria (AGIDIESNFGDQ) and they were used to

collate data from the respondents. The face and content validity test of the instruments were determined by Seniors Political Scientists and Statisticians in Kwara State University Malete, Nigeria.

**6. Empirical Analysis**

**Factors contributing to the trend of godfatherism in Edo State**

Table 1 showed the responses of the respondents on factors contributing to the trend of godfatherism in Edo State.

S/N	Statements	SA	A	SD	D	N	Total	Aggregate Response
1	There is a high cost of electoral campaigning and an insufficiency of party funding.	43 47.9%	40 44.4%	4 4.4%	2 1.2%	1 1.1%	90 100%	Strongly Agreed
2	There is weak political ideology and mass poverty among the party members.	27 30%	37 41.1%	14 15.6%	11 12.2%	1 1.1%	90 100%	Agreed
3	Low level of political elites and lack of patriotic leaders among the political parties.	31 34.4%	29 32.2%	14 15.7%	13 14.4%	3 3.3%	90 100%	Strongly Agreed
4	Military incursion in politics and absence of transparency, accountability as well as due process.	35 38.8%	21 23.3%	17 18.9%	10 11.1%	7 7.9%	90 100%	Strongly Agreed

Source: Researcher's Field Survey 2025

Table 1 above explains that, 43 (47.9%) + 40 (44.4%) = 83 (92.3%) agreed, while only 2 (2.2%) disagreed. This implies that the high cost of electoral campaigning and the insufficiency of party funding significantly contribute to the trend of godfatherism in Edo State. Also, Respondent 12<sub>Ed</sub>, opined that, godfatherism is a situation in which someone is in charge of political activities trying to fix someone into politics and if the road is not good again, the next thing is to remove the person at all cost. (FGD, Fieldwork 2025). Nkwede & Ibeogu (2024) argued that godfatherism has threatened the country's nascent democracy since 1999 and Lotshwao (2009) sees internal democracy within the political parties as a threat to consolidate democratic state. *On whether there is weak political ideology and mass poverty among the party members.* Data collected revealed that 27 (30%) + 37 (41.1%) = 64 (71.1%) agreed, while only 11 (12.2%) disagreed. These findings show that weak political ideology and mass poverty among party members significantly contribute to the persistence of godfatherism in the state.

**The role of party internal democracy in the relationship between godfathers and godsons in Edo State**

Table 2 showed the responses of the respondents on the role of party internal democracy in the relationship between godfathers and godsons in Edo State.

S/N	Statements	SA	A	SD	D	N	Total	Aggregate Response
5	Godfathers utilize all their resources during the election campaigning and it affects infrastructural development.	38 42.2%	26 29%	18 20%	6 6.6%	2 2.2%	90 100%	Strongly Agreed
6	The fear of impeachment from office makes the sitting governor lack focus.	27 30%	35 38.8%	15 16.7%	8 9%	4 5.5%	90 100%	Agreed
7	There are always legal tussles between the godfathers and godsons in the State as a result of internal democracy.	27 30%	30 33.3%	17 18.9%	11 12.2%	5 5.6%	90 100%	Agreed
8	Godfathers received big contracts without executing the projects.	35 38.9%	23 25.6%	18 20%	10 11.1%	4 4.4%	90 100%	Strongly Agreed

Source: Researcher's Field Survey 2025

Findings from the second objective, which is to evaluate the role of party internal democracy on the relationship between the godfathers and the godsons in Edo State. *On whether godfathers utilize all their resources during the*

*election campaigning and it affects infrastructural development:* Table 4.4 above revealed that 38 (42.2%) + 46 (41.8%) = 84 (84%) agreed, while 18 (20%) + 6 (6.6%) + 2 (2.2%) = 26 (28.8%) disagreed. These findings revealed that the excessive financial involvement of political godfathers in electioneering significantly diverts resources that could otherwise be used for infrastructural development. Sapele & Jeko (2024) opined that godfatherism has very negative consequences and if necessary, steps are not taken,

*On whether there are always legal tussles between godfathers and godsons in Edo State due to internal democracy:* The quantitative data collected revealed that, 27 (30%) + 23 (20.9%) = 50 (50.9%) agreed, while 17 (18.9%) + 11 (12.2%) + 5 (5.6%) = 33 (36.7%) disagreed. These findings indicate that internal democracy challenges within political parties contribute to frequent legal battles between political godfathers and their protégés in Edo State. While Respondent 3<sub>Ed</sub> also said that, when there is a conflict between the godfather and godson, the roads that pass through the axis of the godfather will be neglected for maintenance or construction. He concluded that public funds that were meant to provide quality water and construction of roads would be diverted into private accounts by the godfather and godson. (FGD, Fieldwork 2025)

**The Impact of Party Financial Incapacitation on Internal Democracy in Edo State**

Table 3 showed the responses of the respondents on the impact of party financial incapacitation on internal democracy and how it affected infrastructural development in Edo State.

S/N	Statements	SA	A	SD	D	N	Total	Aggregate Response
9	Political parties in the State revolve around self-finance.	37 41.1%	29 32.2%	11 12.2%	8 8.9%	5 5.6%	90 100%	Strongly Agreed
10	Corrupt practices of the godfathers and godsons bring disparity in development in the State.	26 28.9%	30 33.3%	21 23.3%	9 10%	4 4.5%	90 100%	Agreed
11	Strategies to conduct and supervise primaries, congresses and conventions solemnly rest in the hands of godfathers and godsons.	32 35.6%	26 28.9%	19 21.1%	10 11.1%	3 3.3%	90 100%	Strongly Agreed
12	A larger percentage of the contributions towards party funding come from godfathers, godsons, stakeholders and gladiators.	32 35.6%	26 28.8%	14 15.6%	10 11.1%	8 8.9%	90 100%	Strongly Agreed

*Source: Researcher’s Field Survey 2025*

Findings from the third objective, is to investigate the impact of party financial incapacitation on internal democracy in Edo State. On whether political parties in Edo State revolve around self-finance, data collected revealed that, 37 (41.1%) + 48 (43.6%) = 85 (84.7%) agreed, while 29 (32.2%) disagreed. It is important to stress that, Respondent 3<sub>Ed</sub> submitted that, internal democracy means internal arrangement, picking the candidate that will represent them in the affairs of politics. (Fieldwork Interview, 2025). This submission is line with Yahaya & Abba (2021) when they argued that godfatherism lead to inter party and intra party defections among the political parties and party members in Nigeria.

*On whether the strategies to conduct and supervise primaries, congresses, and conventions solemnly rest in the hands of godfather and godson:* Quantitative results revealed that, 32 (35.6%) + 32 (29.1%) = 64 (64.7%) agreed, while 26 (28.9%) disagreed. Respondent 5<sub>Ed</sub> explained that, the impact of godfatherism and internal democracy on infrastructural development could be seen as bad roads cut across the nooks and crannies of the state, bad water through contaminated efforts, human activities, industrial waste, sewage, domestic waste and crude oil extraction. He submitted that the incumbent governor of the state Monday Okpebholo inspected bad roads less than one month in office. (FGD, Fieldwork 2025).

**7. Discussion of findings**

The first objective is on factors that contributed to the trend of godfatherism in Edo State. The lack of patriotic leaders and the insufficiency of visionary political elites are also noted in the study as important problems. This factor weakens political structures, according to 65.6% of respondents. This finding supports Eze (2020), who argues that the absence of ideologically driven leadership fosters self-serving political ambitions, weakening democratic institutions.

The second objective is on the role of party internal democracy on the relationship between the godfathers and the godsons in Edo State. 50.9% of respondents concurred that frequent legal disputes between godfathers and their protégés are a result of internal democracy issues inside parties. These findings support the claims made by Theriault (2008) argued that congress of the political party polarizes the political party more and the issue of congress is accounted to increase frequency of polarization because of the procedure used during the process.

The third objective is on the impact of party financial incapacitation on internal democracy and how it affected infrastructural development in Edo State. These results from the third objective demonstrate how party financial incapacity has a major effect on internal democracy in the state. Respondents from Edo State emphasised how godsons' preference for political survival above administration has a detrimental effect on public services and infrastructure. According to the data gathered, godfathers, godsons, and other high-ranking stakeholders provide a substantial amount of party funding.

### 8. Hypothesis Testing

**8.1 H<sub>01</sub>:** Party financial incapacitation of political parties has no significant relationship on infrastructural development in Edo and Kaduna States.

#### 8.2 Model Summary of Hypothesis Three

Model	R	R-Square	Adjusted R-Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.604a	.365	.363	.38947	2.117

Source: Researcher's Field Survey 2025

- a. **Predictors:** (Constant), AV\_ Party financial incapacitation of political parties1
- b. **Dependent Variable:** AV\_ Infrastructural development1

#### 8.3 ANOVAa

Model	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig (p-value)
Regression	28.247	1	28.247	186.451	.000b
Residual	49.875		.148		

Source: Researcher's Field Survey 2025

Total 78.122 339

- a. **Dependent Variable:** AV\_ Infrastructural development1
- b. **Predictors:** (Constant), AV\_ Party financial incapacitation of political parties1

#### 8.4 Coefficients

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig (p-value)
	B	Std. Error	Beta	
3 (Constant)	2.103	.087		24.178
AV Party financial incapacitation of political parties3	.425	.031	.604	13.654

Source: Researcher's Field Survey 2025

- a. **Dependent Variable:** AV\_ Infrastructural development1

The null hypothesis (H<sub>01</sub>) is rejected since the p-value is less than 0.05 and *this means that party financial incapacitation of political parties has significant relationship on infrastructural development in Edo and Kaduna States.*

**8.5 H<sub>02</sub>:** Imposition of candidates has no significant relationship on infrastructural development in Edo and Kaduna States.

#### 8.6 Model Summary of Hypothesis Four

Model	R	R-Square	Adjusted R-Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.578a	.334	.332	.40215	2.095

Source: Researcher's Field Survey 2025

- a. **Predictors:** (Constant), AV\_ Imposition of candidates 2
- b. **Dependent Variable:** AV\_ Infrastructural development2

**8.7 ANOVAa**

Model	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig (p-value)
Regression	26.379	1	26.379	162.985	.000b
Residual	54.791	338	.162		
Total	81.170	339			

Source: Researcher’s Field Survey 2025

- a. **Dependent Variable:** AV\_ Infrastructural development2
- b. **Predictors:** (Constant), AV\_ Imposition of candidate2

**8.8 Coefficients**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig (p-value)
	B	Std. Error	Beta	
1 (Constant)	1.882	.093		20.237
AV_ Infrastructural development	.398	.031	.578	12.768

Source: Researcher’s Field Survey 2025

- a. **Dependent Variable:** AV\_ Infrastructural development2

The null hypothesis ( $H_{02}$ ) is rejected since the p-value is less than 0.05. This indicates that *imposition of candidates and infrastructural development in the states of Edo and Kaduna are significantly related.*

**9. Conclusion**

Political parties rely on donations from political godfathers and their supporters and this affected internal democracy as could be seen from Respondent 9<sub>Ed</sub> when he said that there should be a kind of enlightenment to the masses and the electorates on the negative impact of godfatherism. Indeed, patron-client relationship in Nigeria politics facilitates financial misappropriation which erodes governance, because public resources are used for political survival rather than development. Conflicts exacerbate underdevelopment by resulting in depilated roads, inadequate water supply and heightened poverty.

In Edo State, godfathers put their own interest a head of political belief and this hindered by godfatherism to enjoy the provision of political dividends and good governance and this could be seen from the responses of the Respondent 6<sub>Ed</sub> when described godfatherism as a system of politics where somebody serves another person as his leader or mentor. The godfather is a politician who act as a father and mentor to the candidates and the godson is a person that is obedient to the godfather. Disenfranchisement remains a key issue in political land scope of Edo State and this compromising the democratic rights of citizens. Respondent 5<sub>Ed</sub> explained that godfatherism bring about flexing of political power between godfather and godson, uncondusive, unsafe and unstable environment, kidnapping, assassination of big whips and party stalwarts. Respondent 14<sub>Ed</sub> responded that godfatherism bring risk on good governance, legal battles and different litigation in the courts of law.

There is continuance occurrence of political violence and electoral fraud which impede Nigeria’s democratic consolidation in Edo State. Political godfathers and their supporters had impacted negatively on electoral process which compromises democratic governance and electoral integrity as could be seen from Respondent 8<sub>Ed</sub>, Respondent 2<sub>Ed</sub> and this jeopardised political stability, democratic governance and election integrity. Respondents interviewed submitted that godfatherism is a deceptive system that restricts the ability of godson to make autonomous policy decisions by forcing them to stay faithful to their sponsors. Godfatherism results in voter rights violations and disenfranchisement according to the findings in Edo State.

**10. Recommendations**

The following recommendations were made to reduce the detrimental consequences of godfatherism and a weak internal democracy and thereby improve infrastructural development in Edo State:

- Electioneering campaigning funds should come directly from consolidated funds established by federal government.
- Improve security to reduce election violence and political thuggery by partner the political parties, traditional rulers, religious organization and nongovernmental organization.
- Introduction of merit-based appointments and performance-based governance
- Political parties in Edo State should implement transparent and democratic systems in candidate selection to eliminate the power of godfathers and relevant stake holders should develop long-term strategies

for sustainable infrastructure development in Edo State. Electoral Act 2022 and other electoral reforms should be enforced on all political parties in Edo State before, during and after the internal democracy.

- There should be a regular political education, orientation and civic engagement from a body such as National Orientation Agency (NOA) and relevant agencies on good governance, internal democracy (congress, primary, convention), election, electoral system, political parties in Edo State.

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